Trump’s Foreign Policy in the Middle East: Conspiratorialism in the Arab Media Sphere by Mahlouly, Dounia & Al Saud, Abdullah
     
1     
     
  
This is the version of the chapter accepted for publication in Trump’s Media War published by Palgrave 
McMillan https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-94069-4_15  
 




TRUMP’S FOREIGN POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST:   




Al Saud, A. and Mahlouly, D. (2018) ‘Trump’s Foreign Policy in the Middle East:  
Conspiratorialism in the Arab Media Sphere’, In: Happer, C, Hoskins, A. and Merrin, 




Paper presentedat the ‘Trump and the Media’ Conference,  
14 June 2017, University of Glasgow  
  
  
    
Introduction  
The success of Donald Trump’s presidential campaign is commonly regarded as the sign of a 
trend towards populist identity politics, which partly resulted from today’s controversial 
immigration debates and increasing perception of threat to global security. This phenomenon 
appears to have primarily manifested itself in recent European elections and referendums, as 
illustrated by Brexit and the success of the Front National candidate in the first round of the 
2017 French presidential campaign. However, there is also reason to believe that Donald 
Trump’s approach to national identity and political communication impacted on some of the 
politically–driven ethnic and sectarian conflicts that occur in regions suffering high political 
instability, such as the Middle East. Therefore, in order to assess the significance of Trump’s 
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populist discourse on the global political culture, it is worth investigating reactions to his 
foreign policy in the Middle East.   
Some experts have already underlined the fact that Trump’s controversial statements on Islam 
are likely to enhance anti–Western sentiment (Winter 2016; McKernan 2017) and that the 
inconsistency of his foreign policy raises further political uncertainty for the region (Burke 
2016; Walt 2017). However, we still have yet to understand how his foreign policy is being 
framed to accommodate the distinctive media narratives that are competing in the Arab media 
sphere as well as how it is received in the regional public debate. Does Trump’s foreign policy 
underpin diverging interpretations of the complex struggles for power that are currently at stake 
in Iraq and Syria and does this generate conspiratorialism (Hannah and Benaim 2016; Engel 
2016)?   
In order to reflect on these questions, this paper analyses a sample of news reports from Al 
Ahram, Al Arabiya, and Al Jazeera, covering four specific major events during Trump’s early 
presidency. By evaluating how the news were originally framed and commented on by the 
media outlets’ readership, the article attempts to investigate how President Trump’s foreign 
policy discourse and positions are received and reported in the Arab media, and to what extent, 
if any, do they exacerbate the current climate of uncertainty engulfing the region and beyond. 
In theory, as we shall see, conspiracy theories thrive in such environments. The aim is to 
investigate whether or not the reality validates that theory.  
Conspiracy theory and political uncertainty in the information age  
What is a conspiracy theory and how does one operate in today’s global media environment? 
From the aftermath of the Cold War to the rise of the 2000s’ digital revolution, social scientists 
have opposed two divergent approaches to the study of conspiracy theories, which differ in 
whether conspiracy theorists embrace or reject the status quo. The first, as described by Serge 
Moscovici in his essay “Conspiracy Mentality” (1987), is that of an irrational feeling of 
resentment expressed by the majority towards a minority. In this case, so–called conspiracists 
are commonly blamed for the fact that they do not conform to the norm and are therefore 
regarded by the compliant majority as unfairly privileged. From this perspective, 
conspiratorialism is to be understood as “the psychology of resentment” (ibid. 162). It manifests 
itself as a prejudice towards the minority, which is induced by a rather “ethnocentric and 
dogmatic” (ibid. 154) form of social identity. As a result, resentment often manifests itself as a 
fear of the other and the foreigner, who potentially represent a threat to social cohesion. This 
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perceived external threat endorses all sorts of phantasmagoric representations meant to 
emphasize the supposedly inexorable incompatibility between the in–group and the outsider 
(ibid. 163).   
The alternative perspective can be found in the work of Parish and Parker (2001) and Dean 
(2000), who define conspiracy theory as a reaction to the uncertainty of the modern world 
(Parish and Parker 2001). In their view, conspiracy theory evidences one’s ability to question 
the apparent truth and seek for a hidden meaning, however subjective or superstitious, of our 
social reality. Their conception of conspiracy theory is that of a cognitive process that 
potentially challenges the norm and allows one to think critically about the world.   
This certainly demonstrates that what may be defined as a conspiracy theory remains 
intrinsically relative. In spite of this, researchers agree to define conspiratorialism by a common 
set of characteristics, such as paranoid skepticism, a tendency to displace responsibility for 
social problems (Showalter 1997), a feeling of insecurity, and a propensity to position oneself 
as a victim (Moscovici 1987: 163; Parker 2001: 198). The latter tradition however pays 
particular attention to how conspiratorialism relates to postmodernity and to the climate of 
anxiety generated by economic globalization and the emerging technoculture (Stewart 1999; 
Dean 2000). In this regard, Dean introduces a relevant reflection as to how today’s increasing 
consumption of information might ironically intensify our feeling of uncertainty:  
[I]nformation does not necessarily correlate with clarity and transparency, not to 
mention goodness and accountability. (…) Information may obfuscate even more 
than it clarifies. This is an important insight today, the technocultural “post” to 
postmodernity. It reminds us that telling the truth has dangers all its own, that a 
politics of concealment and disclosure may well be inadequate in the information 
age. (Dean 2000)  
This inevitably brings us to reflect on the relationship between conspiratorialism and the 
possible revival of information warfare. As argued by George Marcus (1999), it is a context 
similar to that of the cold war and characterized by information warfare and political 
uncertainty that precisely explains today’s propensity to individual skepticism:  
[T]he cold–war itself was defined throughout by a massive project of paranoid 
social thought and action that reached into every dimension of mainstream culture, 
politics, and policy. Furthermore, client states and most regions were shaped by the 
interventions, subversions, and intimidations pursued in the interest of global 
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conspiratorial politics of the superpowers. The legacies and structural residues of 
that era make the persistence, and even increasing intensity, of its signature 
paranoid style now more than plausible, but indeed, an expectable response to 
certain social facts (ibid. 2).  
Assuming that today’s conspiratorialism is, indeed, part of the legacies of the cold war, how 
does it fit within the recent interplay of proxy wars currently at stake in the Levant region? 
How does it react to superpower foreign policy in the information age, and how does it operate 
when different media narratives compete on the transnational scale? In order to explore some 
of these questions, this paper shows how Trump’s positions regarding foreign policy in the 
Middle East evolved since the 2016 presidential campaign. It examines how this may intensify 
the current climate of political instability in the Middle East and investigates how Trump’s 
foreign policies in relation to the global security crisis have been reported by three distinctive 
Arab media outlets. Finally, by outlining the preliminary results of a thematic analysis 
conducted on a dataset of online readers’ comments, this paper introduces a reflection as to 
how Trump’s political communication impacts on the polarization of the political debate in the 
MENA region.    
Trump’s foreign policy before and after the election: political uncertainty rising in the 
Middle East  
Many of President Donald Trump’s actions following his assumption of power in January 2017 
stand at odds with his previous rhetoric on the earlier campaign–trail. The areas of foreign 
policy in which President Trump has reversed course are plenty, including his policy on NATO, 
the European Union, China, North Korea, and Russia. However, we will narrow our focus, for 
the purpose of this paper, to those pertaining to the Middle East region. With regards to the 
main Middle Eastern issue at the moment, the revolution turned civil war in conflict–ridden 
Syria, candidate Trump was very critical of any US involvement during the Obama years and 
wanted to stay out of it (Griffing 2017; Jacobs 2015). However, President Trump proved willing 
to enforce the red line drawn by his predecessor, President Obama, with his first major military 
airstrike hitting the Syrian airbase from which the Syrian president’s planes launched the Khan 
Sheikhun chemical attack, which killed more than 80 people in early April 2017 (BBC News 
2017).  
A couple of months later, on June 19, a Syrian army jet was shot down by a US warplane, which 
was framed by Russia as “an act of aggression” (Reuters and Haaretz 2017). This has put 
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President Trump on a collision course with Russia, a country that has entered the war in Syria 
in support of the regime in Damascus. Russia was at the receiving end of Trump’s soft approach 
and kind gestures during the campaign, thus fueling perceptions of a collusion between the two. 
However, during a press conference in April, President Trump said, “We are not getting along 
with Russia at all. We may be at an all–time low in terms of a relationship with Russia.” While 
candidate Trump indicated that he would look into lifting the sanctions against Russia (Pager 
2016), President Trump actually approved and signed a Russian sanctions bill in early August, 
prompting a Russian retaliation by ordering hundreds of US diplomats to leave the country 
(Tracy 2017), resulting in a tit–for–tat US response.  
Regarding Iran, a blend of tough talk and targeted sanctions characterize both Trump’s 
campaign rhetoric and the first 100 days of his administration. However, while he promised 
during the elections to tear up the nuclear Iran deal, he has yet to do that as of the time of writing 
this paper. Moreover, while candidate Trump, following the November 2015 Paris terrorist 
attacks, called for a temporary ban on all Muslims to enter the US (Revesz and Griffin 2016), 
he, as president, issued a much narrower travel ban blocking migrants from only seven 
countries linked to concerns about terrorism, and then six after exempting Iraq, for a period of 
90 days (Schear and Cooper 2017; Trush 2017).   
With regards to the Arab Gulf states, apart from fleeting mentions about how he thought they 
should contribute more financially towards the stability and security of the region, candidate 
Trump did not elaborate on the nature of the relationship that he envisions or his opinion on his 
predecessor’s “share the neighborhood” attitude to power politics—between Saudi Arabia and 
Iran, in particular. However, he chose Saudi Arabia to be the destination of his first foreign 
visit, from where he articulated his vision of “peace, security, and prosperity—in this region, 
and in the world” (The White House 2017). Despite President Trump briefly mentioning Qatar 
as “a crucial strategic partner” in his Riyadh Summit speech, he strongly supported the boycott 
imposed on it by the quartet of Arab states led by Saudi Arabia a week later. He tweeted that it 
is “so good to see the Saudi Arabia visit with the King and 50 countries already paying off. 
They said they would take a hard line on funding extremism and all reference was pointing to 
Qatar.”  
President Trump was propelled to victory on a wave of nationalist and populist sentiments 
sweeping across the West. While his campaign promises to put “America first” played a huge 
part in his appeal and success, it caused a great deal of anxiety in many US friends and allies 
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around the world who started to fear that their relationship with the world’s superpower could 
be jeopardized by divisive identity politics and protectionist ambitions. To those who were 
worried about his earlier rhetoric, it is positive that, as president, he reversed course on most of 
the controversial issues addressed earlier. To others who expected him to herald a break with 
traditional American foreign policy, this was certainly a disappointment.    
In both cases, one could easily argue that Trump’s unpredictable approach to foreign policy—
and possible lack of long–term vision—implicitly calls for a remolding of political alliances in 
a region that has been suffering from political instability since 2011. Most importantly, beyond 
strictly geopolitical concerns, the inconsistencies of Trump’s administration (both over time 
and among the members) is likely to have an impact on public opinion, by encouraging 
conspiratorialism in an environment where diverging media narratives are already competing 
on both the national and regional scale. Indeed, as the conspiracy literature mentioned above 
would suggest, conspiratorialism may be interpreted as the urge to explain the unexplainable, 
especially in a context of insecurity or the perception of threat. The process through which 
Trump has been shifting his position from the 2016 presidential campaign to the early stage of 
his presidency most certainly remains incoherent and can easily be considered as inexplicable 
by those, in the Middle East, who experience a strong feeling of insecurity today.  
Four media events covering Trump’s foreign policy in the Middle East  
In order to better understand the dialectic between Trump’s foreign policy and the media 
narratives currently competing in the Middle East, the preliminary findings outlined in this 
chapter focus on four media events relayed in three Arab media outlets. The former have been 
selected to map the evolution of Trump’s foreign policy in the region in the early stage of his 
presidency. Therefore, when analyzed together and chronologically, they reveal the 
inconsistency and lack of rationality pervading Trump’s political stand vis–à–vis the Middle 
East, which, as per our hypothesis above, potentially offers more grounds for conspiratorialism.   
The four media events we considered are:  
1. November 2016 US presidential election concluding the controversial campaign, during which 
candidate Trump alluded to Islam as a vehicle for terrorism and welcomed the possibility of 
strengthening the US’s relationship with Russia.  
2. The Executive order issued on March 6, 2017, following on from the January 27 travel ban, 
which prevented entry to citizens from Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen.  
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The new travel ban excluded Iraq from the list of seven Muslim–-majority countries initially 
blocked.   
3. US forces bombing the Syrian pro–-Assad airbase, from which the Khan Sheikhun chemical 
attack against civilians was launched in April 2017.  
4. President Trump’s speech at the Arab Islamic American Summit in Riyadh, which took place 
as part of Trump’s first foreign trip in May 2017.  
In order to investigate the coverage of these events across the region, we explored how they 
have been reported in three major Arabic media outlets representative of different political 
agendas in the Arab media sphere. A dataset of news reports relaying some of the events listed 
above has been published on the media’s online portals along with a set of readers’ comments. 
The three news sources were the state–owned Egyptian newspaper Al-Ahram, the Saudi news 
satellite channel Al Arabiya, and the Qatari channel Al Jazeera.  
• Al Ahram—The Egyptian daily newspaper was originally founded in the late nineteenth century 
and is amongst the most influential and popular media outlets in the Arabic press. It has 
occasionally been criticized for being the subject of censorship and endorsing the views of the 
military elite. In addition to the daily printed version, the newspaper is now published online 
via its news platform al Ahram Gate.   
• Al Jazeera—Since 1996, Qatar’s state–owned satellite channel Al Jazeera has promoted itself 
as an independent and unbiased news source, claiming to deliver alternative information to that 
of Western and state–owned Arab media. However, Al Jazeera’s critical stance against local 
governments and Western powers and its support of political Islamists, especially the Muslim 
Brotherhood, along with its lack of any critical coverage of local Qatari issues, have discredited 
its claim to impartiality. In fact, many argued that the global news organization has contributed 
to the relative success of the Islamist opposition in countries that undertook a political transition 
following the 2011 uprisings. The media outlet was, in this regard, part of the reason why other 
Gulf states accused Qatar of underpinning terrorism, by supporting transnational political 
Islamist movements, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, and giving a platform to other more 
sinister groups and organizations, such as al–Qaeda.   
• Al Arabiya—The pan–Arab news website and TV channel owned by the private Saudi media 
group MBC was launched in 2003. Experts commonly agree that the channel had been initially 
created to act as the direct competitor of the Qatari channel Al Jazeera and as a way to promote 
a more critical perspective on political Islamist opposition groups. Al Arabiya faced particular 
criticism from officials of two Shia majority countries, namely Iraq and Iran. Along with its 
sister channel Al Hadath, the channel was criticized for raising criticism against the two 
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governments—especially after the 2014 breakdown of Iraqi military forces in Mosul. In both 
countries, reporters were occasionally banned and the channel was threatened to have its local
   offices shut down.  
The three news sources act as the voice of different kinds of leadership in the Gulf and North 
Africa, while reaching an equally large and diversified Arabic–speaking audience. As a result, 
one can expect that the process through which they frame US foreign policy—and Trump’s 
administration in particular—may vary and potentially relate to different narratives. Their 
coverage of our chosen events is highlighted in Table 1 below and will be discussed specifically 
within the following context.  
In Egypt, despite public opinion remaining highly polarized in the aftermath of the July 2013 
coup, the pro–military government celebrated the election of Trump, whom they regarded as a 
stark alternative to the Obama administration and a more reliable shield against the Muslim 
Brotherhood. In an interview published in November 2016 by the pro–military Egyptian 
newspaper Al Ahram, the Lebanese–born American campaign advisor to Trump Walid Phares 
referred to the candidate as the representative of the silent majority—in both Egypt and the US. 
Phares emphasized the fact that Trump had developed strong ties with President Sisi, calling 
him an “ally of moderate Arab and Islamic forces.”  
    
  
Table 1: News report dataset  
  
 Dataset     
 Media  Title  Date  Numb. of comments  Event  Type  
1  Al Ahram  
تراامب ییطییح براافضي 
تطبییق قرااررااتت حظر 
 االالجئیین .. 
January 2, 
2017   4  
Immigration 
ban  News  
2  Al Jazeera  
ترمب ییوقع اامراا جدییداا 
بشأنن االھھجرةة ییستھھدفف 
 ددووال مسلمة
March 3, 
2017   10  
Immigration 
ban  News  
3  Al Ahram  





7, 2016  0  
US presidential 
elections   Interview  
4   Al Ahram  




9, 2016  1  
US presidential 
elections  News  
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9, 2016  25  
US presidential 
elections  News  
6  Al Jazeera   االمتحدةةتراامب ررئییسا للوالییاتت 
November 
9, 2016  41  
US presidential 
elections  News  
7  Al Arabiya  
 خطابب ترمب من 
االرییاضض...حدییث عن 
 ووجھھ االتطرفف في ووحدةة
May 20, 
2017  1  Riyadh speech  News  
8  Al Jazeera  




2017  4  Riyadh speech  News  
9  Al Jazeera  
قصف أأمییركي بعشرااتت 
االصوااررییخ على مطارر 
 قربب حمص
April 7, 
2017  51  
Syrian military 
base airstrike  News  
10  
Al Arabiya   أأمرییكا تھھاجم االنظامم
 االسورریي بب 
 صاررووخ اً  59
April 7, 
2017  132  
Syrian military 
base airstrike  News  
11  
  Al Ahram  
قصف قاعدةة 
 االجوییة« االشعییرااتت»
 صاررووخخ  59بـ 
 9توماھھھھوكك.. وومقتل 
 مدنیییین .. 
مصر تدعو أأمرییكا 
ووررووسییا للتحركك إلنھھاء 
 ااألززمة االسوررییة
April 8, 
2017  4  
Syrian military 
base airstrike  News  
12  
  
Al Arabiya   ترمب ییوقع أأمراا تنفییذییا
حولل االھھجرةة ووییستثني 
 االعرااقق
March 6, 
2017  5  
Immigration 
ban  News  
13  Al Ahram   حظر االسفر»قراارر تراامب تدااعییاتت» 
February 
8, 2017  0  
Immigration 
ban  Editorial  
    
As mentioned above, the political tensions that were about to manifest themselves between 
Qatar and Saudi Arabia in June 2017 had apparently not been anticipated by the US president 
at the time of the 2017 Summit in Riyadh. This prompts the thought that Trump’s relationship 
with Qatar may not have been as well–defined as his relations with the Egyptian military regime, 
and one could argue that Al Jazeera’s coverage of the presidential campaign indicates that the 
country’s leadership implicitly supported the Democrats (Al Jazeera English 2016).  
Alternatively, despite referring to candidate Trump as “a disgrace (…) to all America” in a 
tweet prior to the election, Saudi Prince Alwaleed bin Talal, was, with President Sisi, amongst 
the first leaders to congratulate Trump for his victory. On the eve of the US president’s official 
trip to Riyadh, the two countries appeared to have “revitalised [their] friendship” and come to 
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an agreement with regards to intensified military action in Yemen and the revival of a 
traditionally confrontational US foreign policy vis–à–vis Iran (Malsin 2017).   
Media framing and readers’ comments:  
• Trump’s election:  
While both Al Arabiya and Al Ahram remained largely factual and on point in their reporting 
on Trump’s victory in the race to the White House, Al Jazeera tried to explain Trump’s win by 
arguing that “despite polls showing that 60 per cent of Americans do not consider Trump fit to 
be president, the controversial republican candidate won the support of many voters who were 
disgruntled with Obama’s policies.” In the same news report, Al Jazeera highlighted the many 
controversial statements that Trump made regarding his foreign policy for the Arab world, such 
as “his call for the reoccupation of Iraq and the seizure of its oil to confront the Islamic State 
organization.” In short, by including in its reporting statements that Trump is “classified as 
being very close to the far–right in the Republican party” and “he is known for his hostility to 
immigrants in America, especially those who come from Mexican origins,” Al Jazeera referred 
to the new US president in more negative terms.   
Across the dataset, the news of Trump’s election appears to have generated a commonly 
diversified set of comments. On the one hand, some posts stand out for suggesting—in a 
sarcastic tone—that Trump’s administration will jeopardize US democratic values and 
accommodate the military authoritarianism that had been challenged by the 2011 Arab 
uprisings. Another category of readers’ inputs, on the other hand, celebrates Trump’s election 
and welcomes the end of Obama’s administration. The most liked comments on Al Jazeera’s 
piece celebrate Trump’s win because “he will herald the end of America and the end of the 
world”. The majority of Al Arabiya’s comments, 15 out of a total of 25, were celebratory of 
Trump’s win, congratulating him and hoping for a better future. Only three wished that Hillary 
had won. The single comment on Al Ahram expressed joy that “the supporter of Israel and the 
[Muslim] Brotherhood (…) and the so–called Arab Spring that caused wars and destruction in 
our region,” meaning Clinton, did not win. The commenter continued to predict that Trump 
will certainly change after his election just like his predecessors before him.  
• Immigration ban:   
In February, editorialist Dr. Ahmed Sayed Ahmed accused Trump’s executive order of fueling 
a clash of civilizations in an Al Ahram piece that surprisingly contrasted with the interview of 
Trumps’ campaign advisor published by the same newspaper prior to the US election. Both Al 
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Jazeera and Al Arabiya remained relatively factual when reporting the ban. However, whereas 
Al Jazeera’s news report emphasized the popular demonstrations opposing the order, Al 
Arabiya focused on the security concerns related to the ban.  
Between January and March 2017, Trump’s immigration ban generated equally strong 
reactions amongst the readership of the three news sources. Across the dataset, this particular 
media event generated highly critical comments reflecting the controversial nature of the law. 
The US was repeatedly called a racist state, and some readers suggested that similar restrictions 
should be applied in the cases of US nationals willing to enter Arab states. Some comments 
called for boycotts of US products and for improved relationships with alternative powers such 
as Russia, which —in the latter case—could be considered as implicitly revealing pro–Assad 
views. The news of the new executive order issued in March 2017, which excluded Iraq from 
the original list of seven countries impacted by the ban, reactivated the debate on the US 
relationships with Shia–majority countries. A few posts, especially on Al Jazeera, suggested 
that US foreign policy catered to the interests of the latter, and that exempting Iraq—as 
suggested by more than one reader—will allow “Shi’a terrorists from Iran, Lebanon and Yemen” 
to enter the US with an Iraqi passport, as “the US supported and continues to support the Iranian 
occupation of Iraq since 2003.” Another reader commented on Al Arabiya’s reporting that the 
exemption of Iraq is evidence that the decision is illogical:  
“how can Iraq be included for clear reasons and then exempted days later?”.   
• The bombing the pro–Assad military airbase:   
Al Arabiya news report called US strikes on the pro–Assad military airbase a proportionate 
response to the chemical attacks on Khan Shaykhun. It underlined the measures taken to avoid 
civilian causalities by quoting statements from US Defense Department spokesman Jeff Davis 
and US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson. Al Jazeera addressed the event by focusing on its 
impact on US–Russian relations and the possible repercussions in terms of military action. It 
reported statements from the Russian Ambassador to the UN, Vladimir Savronkov, and relayed 
information from a local correspondent and the Syrian state television, so as to cover reaction 
to the events on the ground. Al Ahram, on the other hand, highlighted, in its headline, the Syrian 
press agency’s allegation that the bombing killed nine civilians. It also stressed Egypt’s official 
position calling for the US and Russia to work together to put an end to the Syrian crisis.   
Based on the three news reports from Al Arabiya, Al Jazeera, and Al Ahram considered in our 
sample, this particular media event proves to have generated the highest number of comments 
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within the dataset. Reactions also appeared to be highly polarized, as they conveyed both 
skepticism of Trump’s motivations and joy and enthusiasm at the thought of repressive 
measures against the Syrian regime. In this context, a significant proportion of comments 
suggested that the bombing was “a cheap ploy” designed as part of a strategy to alleviate 
internal pressure in the US, showcase the West’s “humanitarianism,” and divert attention from 
the possible interference of Russia in the US presidential election. This category of comments 
appears to have been particularly critical about the fact that Russian forces had been informed 
of US intentions to attack the airbase and the operation had been conducted so as to reduce the 
risks for Russian and Syrian airport staff. As a result of Al Jazeera’s news report framing the 
event in relation to the broader–spectrum of political alliances involved in the conflict, its 
readers commented on the consequences of the bombings for the different military powers 
involved. More specifically, comments expressed resentment for Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah 
due to their support to the military regime, sometimes questioning the involvement of Israel 
and its security concerns relating to arms smuggling in the North of Lebanon. The most disliked 
comments on both Al Arabiya and Al Jazeera are those few comments defending the Syrian 
regime and its Iranian patronage, while the most liked, especially on Al Arabiya, are those 
showing support for the attack and expressing hope that this will herald the end of the Iranian 
“destructive” influence. The very few comments on Al Ahram were not supportive about the 
bombing. One reader asks, “[H]ow does killing more civilians contribute to solving problems? 
It is obvious that Trump is trying to divert attention from the scandals surrounding his 
administration.”  
  
• The Riyadh Summit speech:   
Al Jazeera published a transcription of Trump’s speech at the Riyadh Summit after 
summarizing the main topics addressed at the event with an emphasis on global security issues, 
sectarianism, and the economic agreements between the US and Saudi Arabia on the eve of the 
summit. Just before the start of the transcription, it also highlighted that the writer of the first 
draft of the speech, according to its correspondent, was Steven Miller who is “a known 
conservative right wing, and one of the most hostile to Muslims and immigrants, and a believer 
in the superiority of the white race.” In doing so, it contributed to portraying Trump as unlikely 
to embrace the Arab Islamic perspective, bringing its readers to question his legitimacy in the 
particular context of the summit.   
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Al Arabiya’s report focused on Trump’s call for unity to confront extremism and fight terrorism 
and on the part of his speech where he denied coming to the summit to give a lecture or teach 
people how to live or worship. Instead, as he himself said, “[W]e are here to offer partnership—
based on shared interests and values—to pursue a better future for us all.”  
Al Ahram did not report directly on the Riyadh Summit’s Trump speech, but focused instead 
on the speech given by President Sisi.    
In contrast with Trump’s speech, three out of the four posts commenting on Al Jazeera’s news 
report manifested sarcasm and resentment against Trump, calling him ignorant and unable to 
comment legitimately on issues relating to politics and religion in the Middle East. Readers 
also expressed discomfort at the thought that the US president could condemn sectarianism, 
despite being involved in the military and political reshaping of the region. In contrast, one 
single comment was added to Al Arabiya news report, welcoming President Trump in Saudi 
Arabia.    
Conclusion  
Admittedly, with the exception of editorials and opinion pieces, our dataset indicates that all 
three media outlets provide, in all appearances, a factual account of US foreign policy. Nothing, 
in terms of media framing, would suggest that any of the three media outlets is feeding a 
particular conspiracy theory. However, Al Jazeera undeniably distinguishes itself by referring 
to the US in more critical terms. Alternatively, Al Arabiya delivers a perspective which is more 
in line with the US government’s narrative, by relying specifically on US official sources. Al 
Jazeera appears to be more inclined to discuss US foreign policy in relation to the way that 
other international powers position themselves vis-à-vis the Syrian crisis. Its news reports may, 
for instance, refer to statements of Russian officials or local correspondents in Syria 
commenting on the position of the Syrian regime. The approach of the Egyptian newspaper Al 
Ahram to US foreign policy proves to be less consistent. This indicates that, despite Trump and 
Egyptian President Sisi equally prioritizing—and potentially capitalizing on—domestic and 
global security issues, Trump’s administration remained, in its early stage, relatively 
controversial in the Egyptian public debate.   
Within the scope of our dataset, the distinctive ideological inclinations of these media outlets, 
however perceptible, do not appear to have a direct impact on readers’ comments. All three 
media outlets generate an equally diversified set of comments, from which conspiratorialism 
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almost consistently evidences the intensively divisive Shia–Sunni conflict. In this context, 
conspiracy theory is therefore to be understood in the sense of resentment (Moscovici 1987). 
As it is debated by media audiences, the inconsistency of Trump’s foreign policy proves to 
conveniently enable multiple and often selectively diverging interpretations of the geopolitical 
interests at stake in the region. However, instead of generating a constructive critique of the 
status quo (Dean 2000), this form of conspiratorialism contributes to the fragmentation and 
polarization of the debate.   
Had we focused on other more universally controversial events, such as the attacks of 11th 
September or the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, we would have presumably encountered 
conspiratorialism on a larger scale. The Middle East is a region plagued with conflict, chaos, 
and instability. In such an environment, it is easy to understand why some people resort to the 
defensive psychological mechanism of “externalization,” whereby they locate and project their 
problems onto an external other. External factors have played a role in many of the region’s 
ills, but it has become increasingly difficult to demarcate, in the face of the current state of 
ambiguity and uncertainty, between fallacious conspiracy theories and legitimate criticism 
relying on rational arguments.   
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